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Abstract
This paper focuses on the observed empirical relationship between ﬁscal rules
and budget deﬁcits, and examines whether this correlation is driven by an omitted
variable, namely voter preferences. We make use of two diﬀerent estimation methods
to capture voter preferences in a panel of Swiss sub-federal jurisdictions. First, we
include a recently constructed measure of ﬁscal preferences. Second, we capture
preferences through ﬁxed eﬀects with a structural break as women are enfranchised.
We ﬁnd that ﬁscal rules continue to have a signiﬁcant impact on real budget balances.
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11 Introduction
The emergence of persistent budget deﬁcits and rising public debt levels in industrialised
countries has triggered a large amount of research into causes and possible solutions. The-
oretical models increasingly incorporate the view that politicians act as optimizing agents
instead of improbable benevolent social planners, in turn illustrating how the political pro-
cess can lead to suboptimal economic outcomes with a bias toward deﬁcits 1. In response
to the emergence of a deﬁcit bias, some have argued in favour of formal restraints on ﬁscal
policy. Skeptics, however, argue that ﬁscal rules can always be circumvented when policy
makers wish to run deﬁcits, and hence, that ﬁscal rules do not work as an eﬀective restraint
on ﬁscal policy.
The empirical evidence that ﬁscal rules result in lower budget deﬁcits tentatively sug-
gests that rules do work. For instance, several studies conducted at the sub-federal (can-
tonal) level in Switzerland ﬁnd eﬀects of formal restraints which are both statistically
signiﬁcant and economically quite relevant2. But there is concern that the estimated im-
pact of ﬁscal rules does not constitute a causal link from rules to budgets, but is instead
driven at least partially by unobserved heterogeneity in the cross section. A candidate for
such unobserved heterogeneity is voter preferences. Poterba (1996) argues that
“The critical question for policy evaluation is how to interpret these correla-
tions between budget institutions and ﬁscal policy outcomes. It is possible
1See Persson and Tabellini (2000), chapter 9, and Alesina et al. (1999), chapter 9, for surveys. The
seminal contribution is Weingast et al. (1981).
2In Switzerland, a structural balanced budget rule was adopted at the federal level in 2002, and at the
cantonal level there is an increasing drive to adopt similar budget rules with the aim of controlling local
government indebtedness.
2that the correlations simply reﬂect correlations involving ﬁscal discipline, ﬁscal
institutions, and an omitted variable, voter tastes for ﬁscal restraint.”3
Suppose that more ﬁscally conservative voters prefer lower budget deﬁcits and prefer
their constitutions to reﬂect this by containing balanced budget rules or debt “breaks”,
even though these rules are not ex post enforceable. Suppose also that politicians on
average care about reelection and have a greater probability of reelection if they cater
to voters’ preferences (a median voter type of argument). Then jurisdictions with more
ﬁscally conservative electorates would tend to see lower budget deﬁcits as well as a higher
likelihood of having a ﬁscal rule, without necessarily having any direct eﬀect of the latter
on the former.
This paper tests whether the often estimated impact of ﬁscal rules on budgetary out-
comes is mainly driven by voter preferences. We make use of two complementary ap-
proaches. First, we include a new measure of ﬁscal preferences by Funk and Gathmann
(2006) in an otherwise standard panel speciﬁcation for budget deﬁcits. In so doing, we are
able to test whether the signiﬁcance of the statistical relationship between ﬁscal rules and
budget deﬁcits remains once we control for voter preferences. This has not previously been
possible because such measures did not exist or were not reliable. In a second approach,
we follow Daﬄon and Pujol (2001) and assume that an individual voter’s ﬁscal preferences
are largely time-invariant. If this is the case, then the only change in an electorate’s ﬁscal
preferences will happen when the composition of the electorate changes. Over the last 50
years, the most important change in the composition of Swiss cantonal electorates occurred
3Poterba (1996), p. 399.
3when women were granted the right to vote, which happened relatively late (the ﬁrst can-
tons to grant women the right to vote were Neuchˆ atel and Vaud in 1959, and the last was
Appenzell I. Rh. in 1990), and at diﬀerent times across cantons. Krogstrup and W¨ alti
(2007) provide evidence that adding women to the electorate changed the preferences of
the median voter with regard to ﬁscal discipline in Swiss cantons. We therefore propose to
capture the electorate’s preferences for ﬁscal discipline by cross section ﬁxed eﬀects, and
by allowing for a structural break arising from women’s enfranchisement. Including simple
ﬁxed eﬀects in budget balance regressions with ﬁscal rules is not usually done in regressions
including ﬁscal rules because the low time variation in ﬁscal rules indices implies that the
standard ﬁxed eﬀects estimator is likely to produce ineﬃcient estimates. As a remedy, we
make use of the newly proposed vector decomposition approach by Pl¨ umper and Troeger
(2007) to disentangle observed and unobserved cross-sectional heterogeneity. In this way,
we are able to include ﬁxed eﬀects as well as to generate more eﬃcient estimates.
We focus on Switzerland as a case study and ﬁnd that the two estimation approaches
result in the same outcome: ﬁscal rules continue to have a signiﬁcant, positive eﬀect on
budgetary outcomes after controlling for voter preferences. The estimated impact of ﬁscal
rules decreases only by a small amount when voter preferences are taken into account.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on
ﬁscal rules and budgetary outcomes. Section 3 presents our two econometric approaches
to controlling for voter preferences, while Section 4 presents the data. Results for OLS
regressions and vector decompositions are presented in Section 5 and Section 6 respectively.
The ﬁnal section concludes.
42 Review of the literature
A number of empirical studies address the question of whether or not ﬁscal rules have em-
pirical eﬀects on the budget balance and the level of public debt. Much of the work in this
area focuses on federal states, most notably the United States, Canada and Switzerland.
The sub-federal jurisdictions of these countries have some degree of ﬁscal independence and
cross-jurisdictional variation in their ﬁscal institutions, while being less heterogeneous in
other political, institutional or cultural dimensions than central government ﬁscal author-
ities might be. As such, these federal states provide laboratory-like conditions for testing
the impact of ﬁscal rules on budgetary outcomes.
The results of these studies largely support the hypothesis that ﬁscal rules result in
lower budget deﬁcits. Several studies carried out in the mid-nineties for the United States
ﬁnd that the presence and/or strength of ﬁscal rules are associated with faster policy
initiatives to reduce unexpected deﬁcits (Poterba, 1994; Alt and Lowry, 1994) or lower
budget deﬁcits overall (Bohn and Inman, 1996; Alesina and Bayoumi, 1996). Similar
evidence for Canadian provinces indicates that provincial legislation against deﬁcits leads
to stronger budget balances, other things equal (Tellier and Imbeau, 2004). Finally, Feld
and Kirchg¨ assner (2006) and Schaltegger (2002) conclude that ﬁscal rules in Swiss cantons
are associated with smaller budget deﬁcits.
The main question now posed in the literature is whether this correlation between ﬁscal
rules and budgetary outcomes represents a causal relationship. Poterba (1996) notes that
ﬁscal rules and budgetary outcomes would be correlated without any causal relationship
5because of an omitted variable, namely voter preferences. Following Poterba’s critique,
more recent studies attempt to control for voter preferences. Feld and Matsusaka (2003),
in a regression of spending on the presence of mandatory budget referenda in Swiss cantons,
make use of the share of seats held by left-wing parties in cantonal parliaments to capture
voter preferences and ﬁnd that the associated coeﬃcient is not statistically signiﬁcant.
They therefore conclude in favour of a causal relationship between referenda and budgetary
outcomes. However, making use of the relative share of seats held by political parties does
not capture ﬁscal preferences adequately. Voters are likely to choose to support a political
party on the basis of numerous diﬀerent facets, of which only one is the degree of ﬁscal
prudence. The relative share of seats therefore comprises much more information than just
the ﬁscal preferences of voters and as such, it is at best a noisy indicator of ﬁscal preferences.
In the words of Daﬄon and Pujol (2001), “the pertinent measure of conservatism for our
issue ought to be directly related to the notion of ﬁscal conservatism which is diﬀerent
from the general notion of political conservatism”4.
To better control for voter preferences in regressions of ﬁscal outcomes on ﬁscal institu-
tions, Daﬄon and Pujol (2001) and Funk and Gathmann (2006) exploit the instruments of
direct democracy in Switzerland to construct targeted measures of ﬁscal preferences. Swiss
citizens vote several times every year on various issues, including projects with direct ﬁscal
implications. The main idea of these authors is to use the cantonal outcome of federal votes
on ﬁscal matters to construct measures of preferences. Daﬄon and Pujol (2001) identify
seventy-ﬁve federal referenda on ﬁscal issues between 1979 and 1996, and use these to rank
4Daﬄon and Pujol (2001), p. 56.
6cantons according to their share of ﬁscally conservative votes for each of these referenda.
This produces a relative measure of ﬁscal conservatism. As ﬁscal federal referenda are
the same across all cantons, and concern federal ﬁscal issues rather than cantonal ﬁscal
issues, the voter behavior can be directly compared across cantons, as it is less likely to
be linked to the particular ﬁscal situation in the canton in question. Daﬄon and Pujol
(2001) consider the average of the outcome of this ranking across the entire period, and use
this as a time invariant index of ﬁscal conservatism. The hypothesis that ﬁscal preferences
are constant over time is motivated by the fact that the responses of voters are consistent
over long periods of time but change signiﬁcantly from one speciﬁc vote to another. It
therefore appears that the precise nature of the ﬁscal object of the vote aﬀects cantonal
voting outcomes. Daﬄon and Pujol (2001) argue that this volatility occurs despite the fact
that actual preferences do not change.
Daﬄon and Pujol (2001) ﬁnd that the presence of ﬁscal rules or the presence of manda-
tory ﬁscal referenda have no eﬀect on budget deﬁcits once voter preferences are controlled
for. But the result is not very robust as the cross-section regressions exhibit very few
degrees of freedom (there are only 25 Swiss cantons). When using Swiss cantonal data, it
is therefore desirable to extend the sample by exploiting the variation in the time-series
dimension, and thereby to obtain better estimates of coeﬃcients and their respective stan-
dard errors.
Recent work by Funk and Gathmann (2006) on measuring ﬁscal preferences allows
for such time variation. A median voter in a given canton faces a sequence of federal
binary choices between a new policy and the status quo, both of which are characterized
7by attributes (Lancaster, 1966; Gorman, 1980). The median voter votes in favour of the
new policy if her utility of accepting the new policy is greater than her utility of rejecting
the proposition. When the attributes of both the new policy and the status quo are
observed, a probit model can be estimated given the availability of cantonal data on voting
outcomes in federal ballots and a functional form for the utility function of the median
voter. Unfortunately, such attributes are unobservable.
Funk and Gathmann (2006) model the attributes as a set of latent factors (Heckman
and Snyder, 1997). In this setup, the factors are the unobserved attributes and the canton-
speciﬁc factor loadings capture the cantonal median voter’s valuation (preferences) of the
latent policy attributes associated with federal binary choices. Funk and Gathmann (2006)
estimate factor loadings by decade from a dataset of 335 federal votes between 1950 and
2000. They identify three factors, corresponding respectively to a conservative-liberal
dimension, a favourable attitude towards redistribution, and a favourable attitude towards
state regulation. The factor loadings associated with the second factor are then included
into an otherwise standard speciﬁcation for public spending to examine a potential omitted
variable bias in regressions focusing on the relationship between ﬁscal mandatory referenda
and public expenditures in Swiss cantons. When ﬁscal preferences are taken into account,
the eﬀect of mandatory referenda is much smaller than initially thought, and completely
disappears when municipal spending levels are also taken into account. These ﬁndings
imply that controlling for voter preferences remains essential for policy evaluation. We
turn to this below.
83 Empirical strategy
Suppose that the true model of budget balances is given by
bit = αfrit + γvpit + εit (1)
This model abstracts from an intercept term and from other control variables for the
clarity of the exposition. The dependent variable, denoted as bit, measures the budget
balance of canton i at time t, frit is an index capturing the presence or strength of ﬁscal
rules, and vpit stands for the degree of ﬁscal conservatism of the electorate. Estimating
this model by ordinary least squares while omitting voter preferences yields




The estimate of the coeﬃcient α obtained by ordinary least squares, denoted as ˆ αOLS,
is biased and inconsistent when the covariance between ﬁscal rules and voter preferences is
diﬀerent from zero. In other words, the coeﬃcient estimate will be biased and inconsistent
when both the budget balance and the presence/strength of ﬁscal rules are simultaneously
determined by a third factor. In particular, the coeﬃcient estimate will be biased upwards
in so far as it captures part of the eﬀect of voter preferences on the budget balance.
We explore two avenues to address this omitted variable problem. First, we make use
of the measure of cantonal ﬁscal preferences constructed by Funk and Gathmann (2006)
to control for voter preferences in an otherwise standard regression equation for budget
balances. Our aim is to examine whether the statistical signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient
9estimate for ﬁscal rules survives the introduction of a direct measure of voter preferences.
In such a way, we are able to preclude that the estimated relationship is driven only by
voter preferences.
There is a caveat here. Funk and Gathmann (2006) interpret their measure of voters’
ﬁscal preferences as capturing preferences for redistribution and, hence, preferences for
overall spending and the size of the state. Since there is no direct or obvious link between
preferences for more public spending and preferences for larger budget deﬁcits if the in-
tertemporal budget constraint is understood and respected, we have to assume that this
measure also captures preferences for intertemporal redistribution (we could also resort to
ﬁscal illusion theories a la Buchanan, 1964, to make a link from size of the state to deﬁcits).
But it is not possible to know whether preferences for ﬁscal discipline are actually captured
by this measure. We nevertheless use it since it is the best that we have for sub-federal
entities in Switzerland, and keep this caveat in mind for the interpretation of our result.
Because of the lack of a clear interpretation for this measure of ﬁscal preferences, we
propose a second and alternative way of controlling for voter preferences in budget deﬁcit
regressions relying instead on econometric technique. As in Daﬄon and Pujol (2001),
assume that voter preferences for budget deﬁcits are largely time-invariant. In this case,
equation (1) can be rewritten as
bit = αfrit + γvpi + εit (3)
Exploiting the panel structure of the dataset allows to capture cantonal ﬁscal prefer-
10ences through the introduction of cross-section ﬁxed eﬀects. This is indeed the standard
motivation for using panel data in that it solves the problem of time-invariant omitted
variables. But many authors, e.g. Feld and Kirchg¨ assner (2006), have resisted using ﬁxed-
eﬀects estimation on the ground of eﬃciency. Fiscal rules display relatively little time
variation and the introduction of ﬁxed eﬀects implies that we do not take the between
variation of the data into account. Consequently, the standard error of the coeﬃcient
estimates will be very large, thereby making statistical inference diﬃcult.
We remedy the problem of ineﬃciency of the ﬁxed-eﬀects estimation by applying the
ﬁxed-eﬀects vector decomposition approach of Pl¨ umper and Troeger (2007). Suppose that
budgetary outcomes depend on a time-varying explanatory variable, denoted as xit, a set
of time-invariant cantonal characteristics (such as language), denoted as ci, as well as
an almost time-invariant variable capturing the presence of ﬁscal rules. Time-invariant
preferences are assumed to be included in a cross-section ﬁxed eﬀect, denoted as υi. The
model is given as
bit = υi + βxit + ϕci + αfri + εit (4)
In this case, the estimation of the coeﬃcients α and ϕ is problematic because the ﬁscal
rule variable contains very little time variation and time-invariant cantonal characteristics
are perfectly collinear with cross-section ﬁxed eﬀects. Pl¨ umper and Troeger (2007) suggest
estimating this model in three steps. First, we regress budgetary outcomes on the cross-
section ﬁxed eﬀect and the time-varying factor xit, omitting the time-invariant and almost
11time-invariant variables ci and fri:
bit = υi + βxit + εit
Second, we decompose the estimated ﬁxed eﬀect ˆ υi into time-invariant observed het-
erogeneity, captured by ci and fri, and time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, denoted
by ξi. The former part captures the eﬀect of time-invariant and almost time-invariant vari-
ables, whereas the latter part will capture time-invariant cantonal ﬁscal preferences and
other unobserved heterogeneity:
ˆ υi = ψ + βfri + ξi
Finally, we reestimate the full model including the estimated unobserved heterogeneity,
which is by deﬁnition orthogonal to the almost time-invariant variable capturing ﬁscal
rules:
bit = ˆ ξi + βxit + ϕci + αfri + εit
The decomposition allows for solving the problem of ineﬃciency of the coeﬃcient esti-
mates. Pl¨ umper and Troeger (2007) show that this decomposition is a superior approach
(in terms of the root mean squared errors) to the traditional ﬁxed-eﬀects estimation when
the time-invariant or almost time-invariant variables exhibit a ratio of the between variance
to the within variance that is large enough. Pl¨ umper and Troeger (2007) run Monte Carlo
simulations to compare the vector decomposition to the standard ﬁxed-eﬀects approach
12and conclude that the former remains superior whenever the variance ratio exceeds 2.8. In
our context, a variable qualiﬁes as being almost time-invariant when its between variance
is at least 2.8 times its within variance. Our data indicate that the ratio of variances for
our ﬁscal rule dummy variable is 2.92, such that we consider this dummy variable as being
almost time-invariant.
Finally, our assumption of time-invariant preferences could be questioned since our
sample period contains a major structural break in the composition in the electorate.
Female enfranchisement was introduced in diﬀerent years across cantons: women were
ﬁrst given the right to vote in Neuchˆ atel and Vaud in 1959, and the last canton to grant
women the vote was Appenzell I. Rh. in 1990 - all other 23 cantons introduced women’s
suﬀrage between these dates. Krogstrup and W¨ alti (2007) discuss why this enfranchisement
represents a structural break in voters’ preferences and show that women prefer a diﬀerent
level of ﬁscal discipline. This structural break is taken into account in our analysis by
introducing a dummy variable taking a value of one when women have the right to vote in
a given canton in a given year.
4 Data
The sample covers twenty-ﬁve cantons over the period 1955 to 1999. All quantitative
variables included in the regressions are measured in constant 1993 prices (deﬂated with
the consumer price index). Sources and deﬁnitions are summarized in the Appendix.
The dependent variable is the cantonal real budget balance per capita5. Only one canton,
5 Figure A1 in the Appendix shows real budget balances for each canton in each year. We follow Feld
and Kirchg¨ assner (2006) and control for an outlier for Appenzell A. Rh. in 1996 with a dummy variable.
13Appenzell I. Rh., had an average budget balance in surplus across the time span considered,
while all other cantons exhibited average deﬁcits.
There are ﬁve cantons that have ﬁscal rules during our sample period: St Gallen,
Fribourg, Solothurn, Appenzell A. Rh. and Graub¨ unden6. These rules are written either
in the cantonal constitution or in the cantonal budget law. Beyond diﬀerences in their
characteristics and implementation, they have in common that they constrain ﬁscal policy
by limiting the size of deﬁcits and requiring a balanced budget either in the current ﬁscal
year or over the medium term.
The previous theoretical and empirical literature on budget deﬁcits suggests a list of con-
trol variables which are relevant for explaining deﬁcits. Tax-smoothing arguments (Barro,
1979) and Keynesian countercyclical ﬁscal policy prescriptions imply that budget deﬁcits
should co-vary negatively with economic conditions. We therefore control for the rate of
growth of real gross cantonal income (federal and international economic conditions will
be captured through time ﬁxed eﬀects). Fiscal redistribution across cantons is taken into
account by including the growth rate of the real unconditional federal grants per capita
that each canton receives. The cantonal demographic structure could put pressure on can-
tonal public ﬁnances and it is captured by including the share of the population above
sixty-ﬁve years old. We control for changes in the ideological orientation of cantonal par-
liaments (Hibbs, 1977; Persson and Svensson, 1989) by including the share of seats held by
left-wing political parties. Finally, we also make use of dummy variables to take account
of time-invariant cantonal characteristics such as language (which takes a value of unity
6See Feld and Kirchg¨ assner (2006) for a detailed overview of these cantonal rules.
14for French and Italian-speaking cantons), the presence of a large city, and the presence of
a university.
5 Observed ﬁscal preferences: OLS regressions
Our ﬁrst approach to control for voter preferences is to include the measure of cantonal
ﬁscal preferences computed by Funk and Gathmann (2006) into an otherwise standard
regression equation for budget balances. So doing, we are able to test whether the estimate
of the coeﬃcient attached to the dummy variable capturing ﬁscal rules remains statistically
signiﬁcant. Table 1 presents the results.
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
Speciﬁcation (I) includes only time eﬀects, a dummy variable for the outlier of Appenzell
A. Rh. in 1996, and the ﬁscal rule dummy variable. The coeﬃcient estimate is positive
and statistically signiﬁcant: the presence of a ﬁscal rule is correlated with stronger budget
balances, other things equal. Is this correlation reﬂecting causality? Speciﬁcation (II)
augments the basic speciﬁcation by also including the measure of ﬁscal preferences. Two
results emerge. Firstly, the coeﬃcient estimate for ﬁscal rules declines by a relatively small
amount and remains highly statistically signiﬁcant. Therefore, our ﬁrst approach suggests
that allowing for voter preferences does not substantially aﬀect the estimated impact of
ﬁscal rules on budgetary outcomes. Secondly, the negative sign on the measure of ﬁscal
preferences is also as expected: a stronger taste for government is associated with weaker
budget balances, other things equal. This coeﬃcient estimate is statistically signiﬁcant, so
15that voter preferences seem to cause budgetary outcomes independently of ﬁscal institutions
(here captured by ﬁscal rules)7.
Speciﬁcations (III) to (V) include many control variables while omitting voter prefer-
ences. Some observations, including those for Appenzell A. Rh., are lost because there
are no data on the ideology of the cantonal parliament. This explains the mild drop in
the sample size. Overall, lower transfers per capita and the presence of a large city con-
tribute to weaker budget balances. French-speaking and Italian-speaking cantons exhibit
larger deﬁcits as conventional wisdom might suggest. Speciﬁcation (VI) includes all control
variables along with voter preferences. The coeﬃcient estimate for the ﬁscal rule dummy
variable remains highly signiﬁcant with the expected sign8. Interestingly, the direct eﬀect
of voter preferences does not seem to be robust to the inclusion of several control variables.
The coeﬃcient estimate for the variable capturing ﬁscal preferences is signiﬁcant only at
the 10% level.
Overall, including the Funk-Gathmann measure of ﬁscal preferences in regressions of
ﬁscal rules on budgetary outcomes, we ﬁnd no evidence that voter preferences are driving
the estimated qualitative impact of ﬁscal rules. Voters’ ﬁscal preferences do not have a
robust direct eﬀect on budgetary outcomes. However, given the caveat that these are
preferences for redistribution, it is necessary to complement these results with our second
7An interesting little aside here is that if the measure of ﬁscal preferences relate solely to intra-temporal
redistribution issues and the size of the state, the result suggests partial ﬁscal illusion of voters, who prefer
more government without fully internalizing the associated necessary tax increases to comply with the
intertemporal budget constraint.
8Beyond statistical signiﬁcance, our results also cast light on the economic signiﬁcance of ﬁscal rules.
The introduction of ﬁscal rules decreases the average budget deﬁcit per capita by about 83 Swiss francs
(measured in 1993 prices) in a given year. This amount is relatively large compared to the average budget
deﬁcit per capita of Swiss cantons which is equal to 121 Swiss francs (measured in 1993 prices).
16approach.
6 Unobserved ﬁscal preferences: ﬁxed-eﬀects vector
decompositions
Our second approach relies on the assumption that voter preferences are constant over
time, so that they can be captured through cross-section ﬁxed eﬀects. A dummy variable
accounts for the structural break in preferences induced by the enfranchisement of women
during our sample period. Table 2 presents two sets of estimations: speciﬁcations FE(I)
to FE(III) are estimated using the standard ﬁxed-eﬀects approach, while speciﬁcations
VECD(I) and VECD(II) are estimated using the vector decomposition methodology of
Pl¨ umper and Troeger (2007).
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
The estimation results for Speciﬁcation FE(I) show that the introduction of cross-
section ﬁxed eﬀects decreases the size of the coeﬃcient for ﬁscal rules, and makes it not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. This result holds when we add time-varying control vari-
ables in Speciﬁcations FE(II) and FE(III). At ﬁrst sight, therefore, we would conclude that
ﬁscal rules are not causing budgetary outcomes. Furthermore, the strong statistical signif-
icance of the cross-section ﬁxed eﬀects and the dummy variable capturing the structural
break would suggest that voter preferences explain both the presence of ﬁscal rules and
budget balances.
The estimation of the ﬁxed-eﬀects vector decomposition model VECD(I) assumes that
the dummy variable for ﬁscal rules exhibits enough time variation, so that we do not have
17to consider it as an explanatory variable in the second-stage regression. Only the dummy
variables capturing, respectively, language, the presence of a large city and the presence of
a university are considered as time-invariant. Again, the coeﬃcient estimate for ﬁscal rules
is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. However, when we consider the dummy variable
for ﬁscal rules as a rarely changing variable in speciﬁcation VECD(II), as it should be
since its between variance is greater than 2.8 times its within variance, the coeﬃcient
estimate for the dummy variable for ﬁscal rules is positive and statistically diﬀerent from
zero at the 1% level. The value of the estimate is consistent with the results from our
ﬁrst approach. Clearly, an eﬃcient method of estimation shows that ﬁscal rules continue
to exert a positive pressure on budget balances even in the presence of ﬁxed eﬀects. This
ﬁnding lends further support to the results obtained in the previous section. Moreover,
while it is harder to interpret ﬁxed eﬀects than a direct measure of ﬁscal preferences,
the high statistical signiﬁcance of the cross-section ﬁxed eﬀects and the dummy variable
capturing a structural break in the third-stage regression could be taken to imply that
voter preferences have explanatory power on their own.
Standard ﬁxed-eﬀects regressions are highly ineﬃcient when including cross-section
ﬁxed eﬀects along with a ﬁscal rule dummy variable which exhibits little time variation.
As expected, the values of coeﬃcient estimates and the associated t statistics decrease by
a signiﬁcant amount. It is therefore necessary to employ alternative techniques which are
relatively more eﬃcient when the empirical speciﬁcation includes both cross-section ﬁxed
eﬀects and variables that are almost time-invariant. Our results make this point very clear.
187 Concluding remarks
Fiscal indiscipline has been on the rise in industrial countries since the late 1970s, leading
to increasing average levels of deﬁcits and public debt levels. One of the means by which
policy makers have attempted to “tie their own hands”to more ﬁscal prudent policies has
been the adoption of so called ﬁscal rules requiring that budgets remain above a certain
threshold in either actual or cyclically adjusted terms. The question is whether such rules
work, and this question has triggered a large and growing research agenda. The empirical
literature ﬁnds relatively unambiguously that ﬁscal rules are associated with improved
budget balances. But it has not been possible to convincingly establish whether this
relationship represents a causal link from rules to outcomes. The main concern is that the
relationship is driven by a third variable, namely voters’ preferences for ﬁscal policies.
In this paper, we propose two solutions to these issues and investigate whether voter
preferences are ultimately what is driving budget balances and ﬁscal rules. First, we add
a new measure of ﬁscal preferences of the electorate in Swiss cantons constructed by Funk
and Gathmann (2006) in an otherwise standard regression equation for budget balances.
Second, we seek to capture ﬁscal preferences through the introduction of cross-section ﬁxed
eﬀects with a structural break as the electorate is infused with women voters, and by using
a newly proposed eﬃcient estimator to account for the low within variation of the variable
capturing ﬁscal rules.
We revisit the existing evidence based on Swiss cantonal data with these two approaches
in hand. Our results are consistent across the two methods. When taking into account ﬁscal
19preferences of the electorate, the estimated impact of ﬁscal rules on real budget balances
decreases slightly but remains highly signiﬁcant. Our results therefore lend further support
to the conclusions of the existing literature, and imply that ﬁscal rules might just work for
the purposes of keeping average budget balances in check over the medium to long term,
at least in Swiss cantons.
What our results do not tell us is whether ﬁscal rules work better than other means
of “tying one’s hands”when it comes to a more elaborate set of goals of ﬁscal policy. It is
important in this respect to keep in mind that while ﬁscal rules might enhance ﬁscal dis-
cipline, they have been argued to potentially obstruct the conduct of countercyclical ﬁscal
policy and to reduce beneﬁcial productive public investments (see for example Krogstrup
and Wyplosz, 2007).
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23Table 1: OLS regressionsa,b
Regressors OLS(I) OLS(II) OLS(III) OLS(IV) OLS(V) OLS(VI)
Fiscal rule 89.78 73.45 86.90 84.67 90.67 83.05
(4.00)∗∗∗ (3.17)∗∗∗ (3.86)∗∗∗ (3.71)∗∗∗ (3.34)∗∗∗ (3.01)∗∗∗
Economic growth 5.23 1.39 3.55 3.15
(0.89) (0.24) (0.61) (0.54)
Transfers per capita 118.56 97.99 100.73 100.21
(2.39)∗∗ (1.87)∗ (1.93)∗ (1.93)∗
Share of elderly people -5.01 1.21 10.42 11.12
(0.90) (0.15) (1.27) (1.34)








Fiscal preferences -196.26 -71.08
(6.56)∗∗∗ (1.93)∗
Observations 1125 1125 1125 1024 1024 1024
Cantons 25 25 25 23 23 23
Canton-speciﬁc eﬀects No No No No No No
Time eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 statistic 0.3065 0.3398 0.3124 0.3186 0.3486 0.3504
a Robust standard errors are used. Absolute values of t statistics in parentheses.
∗ Signiﬁcant at 10%; ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5% level; ∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1% level.
b The dependent variable is real budget balances per capita (measured in 1993 Swiss francs).
c As per foonote (5), all regressions include a dummy variable for Appenzell A. Rh. in 1996.
24Table 2: Fixed-eﬀects regressionsa,b
Regressors FE(I) FE(II) FE(III) VECD(I) VECD(II)
Fiscal rule 51.75 50.37 55.91 55.91 97.75
(1.25) (1.20) (1.11) (0.89) (19.94)∗∗∗
Economic growth 5.26 1.97 1.97 1.97
(0.87) (0.31) (0.40) (0.04)
Transfers per capita 96.80 91.69 91.69 91.69
(2.09)∗∗ (1.88)∗ (1.82)∗ (6.98)∗∗∗
Share of elderly people 5.63 21.07 21.07 21.07
(0.40) (1.19) (1.60) (8.18)∗∗∗
Parliament ideology -2.81 -2.81 -2.81
(1.07) (1.09) (0.09)
Language - - - -88.16 -84.51
(3.80)∗∗∗ (3.62)∗∗∗
Large city - - - -118.80 -102.26
(4.38)∗∗∗ (3.40)∗∗∗
University - - - -32.92 -48.73
(1.30) (1.72)∗
Structural break 140.75 143.72 123.48 123.48 123.48
(3.59)∗∗∗ (3.67)∗∗∗ (2.62)∗∗∗ (2.53)∗∗ (2.53)∗∗
Observations 1125 1125 1024 1024 1024
Cantons 25 25 23 23 23
Canton-speciﬁc eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 statistic 0.3404 0.3441 0.3308 0.3966 0.3966
a Robust standard errors are used. Absolute values of t statistics in parentheses.
∗ Signiﬁcant at 10%; ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5% level; ∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1% level.
b The dependent variable is real budget balances per capita (measured in 1993 Swiss
francs).
c As per foonote (5), all regressions include a dummy variable for Appenzell A. Rh.
in 1996.
25A Data sources and deﬁnitions
Nominal budget balances: Swiss Federal Finance Administration, electronic issue.
Population: Swiss Federal Bureau for Statistics, electronic issue.
Consumer price index: base year 1993. Stutzer and Kienast (2005).
Fiscal rules: dummy variable taking a unit value when a ﬁscal rule is in place. Own
calculations based on Schaltegger (2002).
Fiscal preferences: Funk and Gathmann (2006).
Growth rate of real cantonal income: 1965-2002: Swiss Federal Bureau for Statistics. Data
prior to 1965: estimations by Stutzer and Kienast (2005).
Unconditional federal transfers: Swiss Federal Finance Administration, electronic issue,
and Annuaire statistique de la Suisse, various issues.
Income per capita: 1965-2002: Swiss Federal Bureau for Statistics. Data prior to 1965:
estimations by Stutzer and Kienast (2005).
Share of elderly (above 65) people: Stutzer and Kienast (2005).
Share of young (below 20) people: Stutzer and Kienast (2005).
Ideology of cantonal parliaments: share of seats in parliament held by left-wing political
parties. Own calculations based on data from the Swiss Federal Bureau for Statistics,
electronic issue.
Language: dummy variable taking a unit value for French-speaking and Italian-speaking
cantons. Own calculations.
Large city: dummy variable taking a unit value when the canton has a large city. Debrun
(2006).
University: dummy variable taking a unit value when the canton has a university. Debrun
(2006).
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